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ABSTRACT
We describe a system for automated bilateral negotiations in which articial agents are evolved by an evolutionary
algorithm. The negotiations are governed by a nite-horizon version of the alternating-oers protocol. Several
issues are negotiated simultaneously and negotiations can be broken o with a pre-dened probability. In our
experiments the bargaining agents have dierent preferences regarding the importance of the issues, which
enables mutually benecial outcomes. These optimal solutions are indeed discovered by the evolving agents.
We also present an extended model of the evolving agents in which the agents use a \fairness" norm in the
negotiations. This concept plays an important role in real-life negotiations and experimental economics. In
the implementation with fairness, agents also evaluate a potential agreement on its fairness and reject unfair
proposals with a certain probability. In our model, re-evaluation can take place in each round or only if the
deadline of the negotiations is reached. In both cases, fair outcomes can be obtained. When fairness is applied
in each round, the results become much more robust and rather insensitive to the actual fairness function.
To validate our system, the computational results are compared to game-theoretic (subgame perfect equi-
librium) results. The inuence of important model settings, like the probability of breakdown in negotiations,
the length of the game, or the inuence of fairness, as well as the proper settings of the EA parameters and
their sensitivity are substantially investigated in this validation part.
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1. Introduction
Lately, automated negotiations have received more and more attention, especially from the eld of
electronic trading [5, 12, 13, 15]. In the near future, an increasing use of bargaining agents in electronic
market places is expected. Ideally, these agents should not only bargain over the price of a product,
but also take into account aspects like the delivery time, quality, payment methods, return policies,
or specic product properties. In such multi-issue negotiations, the agents should be able to negotiate
outcomes that are mutually benecial for both parties. The complexity of the bargaining problem
increases rapidly, however, if the number of issues becomes larger than one. This explains the need
for \intelligent" agents, which should be capable of negotiating successfully over multiple issues at the
same time.
In this paper, we consider negotiations that are governed by a nite-stage version of Rubinstein's
alternating-oers game [21]. We investigate the computation of strategies of the agents by evolutionary
algorithms (EAs). EAs are powerful search algorithms (based on Darwin's evolution theory) which can
be used to model social learning in societies of boundedly-rational agents [6, 18]. In an evolutionary
setting, the adaptive agents typically learn in dierent ways: learning by imitation, communication
(exchange of strategic information), and experimentation. It is important to note that EAs make no
2explicit assumptions or use of rationality. Basically, the tness (i.e., quality) of the individual agents
is used to determine whether a strategy will be used in future situations.
A small, but growing, body of literature already exists in this eld. Oliver [15] was the rst
to demonstrate that, using an EA, articial agents can learn eective negotiation strategies. In
Oliver's model, the agents use rather elementary bargaining strategies. A more elaborate strategy
representation is proposed and evaluated in [13]. Oers and counter oers are generated in this
model by a linear combination of simple bargaining tactics (time-dependent, resource-dependent,
or behaviour-dependent tactics). A recent, more fundamental, study is [22]. In [22], a systematic
comparison between game-theoretic and evolutionary bargaining models is made.
In this paper we rst assess to what extent the evolutionary computation of agent strategies matches
with game-theoretic results if multiple issues are involved. This work is therefore in line with the work
reported in [22], where bargaining only concerned a single issue. We study models in which time
plays no role, and models in which there is a pressure to reach agreements early (because a risk of
breakdown in negotiations exists after each round).
When no time pressure is present, an extreme partitioning of the bargaining surplus occurs in the
computer experiments (in agreement with game-theoretic results). Such extreme outcomes are not
observed in real-life situations, where social norms such as fairness play an important role [4, 11,
19, 23]. We therefore introduce the incorporation of a fairness norm in the agents' behaviour. The
various fairness models that we incorporate can be tuned from \weak fairness" (i.e., accept almost all
agreements) to \strong fairness" (i.e., even reject most of the \quasi-fair" deals). Also, the fairness
mechanism can be active in each round or only if the deadline is reached. In this way, we achieve fair
deals in our system. Results are depending on the actual fairness settings, but fair deals evolve for
most fairness settings if the agents evaluate the fairness of potential agreements in each round; thus,
results are much more robust when the latter model is used by the agents.
This evolutionary model is a rst attempt to study complex bargaining situations which are more
likely to occur in practical settings. A rigorous game-theoretic analysis is typically much more involved
or even intractable under these conditions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an outline of the setup of
the computer experiments. A comparison of the computational results with game-theoretic results is
presented in Section 3. Fairness is the topic of Section 4. Section 5 summarises the main results and
concludes.
2. Experimental Setup
This section gives an overview of the setup of the computational system and experiments. The
alternating-oers negotiation protocol is described in Section 2.1. Section 2.1 also discusses the agents'
negotiation strategies and how the agents evaluate the outcome of the bargaining process using a
multi-attribute utility function. Section 2.2 then describes the (genetic) representation of the agents'
strategies and the EA which updates these strategies in successive generations.
2.1 Negotiation Protocol and Agent Model
Negotiation Protocol During the negotiation process, the agents exchange oers and counter oers
in an alternating fashion. In the following, the agent starting the negotiations is called \agent 1",
whereas his opponent is called \agent 2".
Bargaining takes place over multiple issues simultaneously. An oer can then be denoted as a vector
~o. The i-th component of this vector, denoted as o
i
, species the share of issue i that agent 1 receives
if the oer is accepted. We assume (without loss of generality) that the total bargaining surplus
available per issue is equal to unity. Agent 2 then receives 1  o
i
for issue i in case of an agreement.
The index i ranges from 1 to m (the total number of issues).
As stated above, agent 1 makes the initial oer. If agent 2 accepts this oer, an agreement is
reached and the negotiations stop. Otherwise, play continues with a certain continuation probability
p (0  p  1). When a negotiation is broken o prematurely, both agents receive nothing. Such a
3breakdown in negotiations may occur in reality when agents get dissatised as negotiations take too
long, and therefore walk away from the negotiation table, or when intervention of a third party results
in a vanishing bargaining surplus.
If negotiations proceed to the next round, agent 2 needs to propose a counter oer, which agent 1
can then either accept or refuse. This process of alternating bidding continues for a limited number
of n rounds. When this deadline is reached, the negotiations end in a disagreement, and both players
receive nothing.
Agent Model An agent's strategy species the oers and counter oers proposed during the process
of negotiation. In a game-theoretic context, a strategy is a plan which species an action for each
history [3]. In our model, a strategy species the oers and thresholds for each round in the negotiation
process. A threshold species whether an oer should be accepted or rejected: If the value of the oer
falls below the threshold the oer is refused; otherwise an agreement is reached.
1
The agents evaluate the oers of their opponents using an additive multi-attribute utility function
[13, 15]. We assume that all agents are risk neutral. Agent 1's utility function u
1
is then equal to
~w
1
 ~o =
P
m
i=1
w
i
1
 o
i
. Agent 2's utility function u
2
is equal to ~w
2
 (
~
1   ~o). Here, ~w
j
is a vector
containing agent j's weights w
i
j
for each issue i. The weights are normalised and larger than zero, i.e.,
P
m
i=1
w
i
j
= 1 and w
i
j
 0. Because we assume that 0  o
i
 1 for all i, 0  u
j
(~o)  1.
2.2 The Evolutionary System
We use an EA to evolve the negotiation strategies of the agents. This section discusses how the EA
has been implemented, and how the system can be interpreted as a model for social or economic learn-
ing processes. The implementation is based on \evolution strategies"(ES), a branch of evolutionary
computation that traditionally focuses on real-coded problems [2].
2
The dierent stages within an iteration of the evolutionary algorithm are depicted in Fig. 1. The
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Figure 1: Iteration loop of the evolutionary algorithm. Two populations of agents, containing agents with
dierent weight vectors, are evolved separately. Agents in population 1 always start the bargaining process. In
the tness evaluation, both the ospring and the parental agents compete against agents in the two parental
populations. The best candidates of the union of parents and ospring are then selected to be the parents in
the next iteration.
system initially starts with two separate and randomly initialised \parental" populations. Agents in
population 1 start the bargaining process (i.e., they are of the \agent 1" type). The tness of the
parental agents is determined by competition between the agents in the two populations. Each agent
1
The same approach was used in [15, 22].
2
The widely-used genetic algorithms (GAs) are more tailored toward binary-coded search spaces [9, 14, 7].
4competes against all agents in the other population. The average utility obtained in these bilateral
negotiations is then used as the agent's tness value.
In the next stage (see Fig. 1), \ospring" agents are created. An ospring agent is generated in
two steps. First, an agent in the parental population is (randomly, with replacement) selected. This
agent's strategy is then mutated to create a new ospring agent (the mutation model is specied
below). The tness of the new ospring is evaluated by interaction with the parental agents.
3
A
social or economic interpretation of this parent-ospring interaction is that new agents can only be
evaluated by competing against existing or \proven" strategies.
In the nal stage of the iteration (see Fig. 1), the ttest agents are selected as the new \parents"
for the next iteration (the selection procedure is explained in detail below). This nal step completes
one iteration (or \generation") of the EA. All relevant settings of the evolutionary system are listed
in Table 1.
EA Parental population size () 25
Parameters Ospring population size () 25
Selection scheme (+ )-ES
Mutation model self-adaptive
Initial standard deviations (
i
(0)) 0.1
Minimum standard deviation (

) 0.025
Negotiation Number of issues (m) 2
parameters Weights of agents in population 1 ( ~w
1
) (0:7; 0:3)
T
Weights of agents in population 2 ( ~w
2
) (0:3; 0:7)
T
Table 1: Default settings of the evolutionary system.
Selection model. Selection is performed using the (+ )-ES selection scheme [2]. In conventional
notation,  is the number of parents and  is the number of generated ospring (==25, see Table 1).
The  survivors with the highest tness are selected (deterministically) from the union of parental
and ospring agents. The (+ )-ES selection scheme is an example of an \overlapping generations"
model, in which successful agents can survive for multiple generations. In an economic context,
selection can be interpreted as imitation of behaviour which seems promising. In general, EAs use two
additional operators: mutation and recombination. These operators are explained in detail below.
Mutation and recombination model. Mutation operates directly on the \chromosome" of an agent.
The chromosome species the strategy an agent uses in the bargaining game. An agent's chromosome
consists of a collection of \genes". These genes contain the values for the oers and thresholds (per
round). In multi-issue negotiations, a sequence of m genes species an oer. Threshold values are
represented by a single gene. Each gene is real-valued with a range between 0 and 1. A similar
strategy representation was used in [15, 22]. Oliver [15], however, used binary-coded chromosomes.
The agents' strategies are initialised at the beginning of each EA run by drawing a random number
in the unit interval for each gene (from a uniform distribution).
The ospring's genes x
i
are created by adding a zero-mean Gaussian variable with a standard
deviation 
i
to each corresponding gene of the parent [2, 22]. All ospring genes with a value larger
than unity (or smaller than zero) are set equal to unity (respectively zero). In our simulations, we
use an elegant mutation model with self-adaptive control of the standard deviations 
i
[2, pp. 71-
73][22]. This model allows the evolution of both the genes and the corresponding standard deviations
3
In an alternative model, not only the parental agents are used as opponents, but also the newly-formed ospring.
This leads to a much more diverse collection of opponents. The tness of the agents therefore becomes more subject to
noise. Nevertheless, similar dynamics have been observed in this alternative model.
5at the same time. More formally, an agent consists of object variables [x
0
; :::; x
l 1
] and ES-parameters
[
0
; :::; 
l 1
] in this model.
The mutation operator rst updates an agent's ES-parameters 
i
into 
0
i
-values in the following
way:

0
i
:= 
i
exp[
0
N(0; 1) + N
i
(0; 1)]; (2.1)
where 
0
and  are the so-called \global" and \individual" learning rates, and N(0; 1) denotes a
normally distributed random variable having expectation zero and standard deviation one. The indices
i in N
i
indicates that the variable is sampled anew for each value of i. We use commonly recommended
settings for these parameters.
4
After the strategy parameters have been modied, the object variables
are mutated:
x
0
i
:= x
i
+ 
0
i
N
i
(0; 1): (2.2)
The initial standard deviations 
i
(0) are set to a value of 0.1 (see Table 1). The particular value chosen
for 
i
(0) is not expected to be crucial, because the self-adaptation process (consisting of the parameter
updating and the chromosome selection process) rapidly scales the step sizes into the proper range.
To prevent complete convergence of the population, we force all standard deviations to remain larger
than a small value "

= 0:025 [2, pp. 72{73] (see Table 1).
Mutation can be interpreted as undirected exploration of new strategies, or as mistakes made during
imitation. Communication between the agents is often modelled by a recombination operator, which
typically exchanges parts of the parental chromosomes to produce new ospring. Earlier experiments
[22] showed little eect on the results when traditional recombination operators from ES (like discrete
or intermediate recombination [2]) were applied. We therefore focus on mutation-based models in this
paper. Note that communication between agents by duplication of (successful) strategies is already
modelled by the selection mechanism.
3. Validation and Interpretation of the Evolutionary Experiments
Experimental results obtained with the evolutionary system are presented in this section. A compar-
ison with game-theoretic results is made to validate the evolutionary approach. Section 3.1 discusses
the ability of the evolutionary system to (a) avoid the occurrence of disagreements and (b) to discover
agreements in the neighbourhood of the Pareto-ecient frontier. Section 3.2 compares, for dierent
settings, the (mean) long-term behaviour of the evolving agents with game-theoretic (subgame perfect
equilibrium) results for 2-issue negotiations. Finally, Section 3.3 reports on additional experiments
involving a more complex bargaining scenario and also concludes.
3.1 The Evolution of Pareto-Ecient Agreements
First, we investigate whether the adaptive agents learn to avoid the occurrence of disagreements. If we
set the continuation probability p equal to 1, and the number of rounds n equal to 10, disagreements
can only occur when the deadline is reached (i.e., after 10 rounds). The computer experiments show
that the percentage of disagreements is very small (around 0:1%), and that in the long run almost all
agreements are reached in the very last round (after 1000 generations, about 80% of all agreements
are reached just before the deadline). Furthermore, the last oering agent in turn demands almost the
entire surplus (for each issue). Nevertheless, his opponent accepts this extreme take-it-or-leave-it deal.
This division of the surplus agrees with game-theoretic results (see Appendix 1.1). Note, however,
that it is rational for agents to accept this division in other rounds as well: We show in Appendix 1.1
with game theory that rational agents are indierent between the round in which the agreement is
reached when p = 1. The deadline-approaching behaviour, that is observed in our computational
experiments when p = 1, corresponds better to \real-world" behaviour [20], however.
4
Namely, 
0
= (
p
2l)
 1
and  = (
p
2
p
l)
 1
[2, p. 72], where l is the length of the chromosome.
6Next, we study a model with a risk of breakdown in the negotiations (p = 0:7). Initially, the
percentage of disagreements is approximately equal to 23%. This percentage rapidly decreases to
a value between 1% and 10%. The number of disagreements decreases because in the long run
most agreements are reached in the rst round (after 1000 generations, approximately 75% of the
agreements are reached immediately). Again, this behaviour is consistent with game-theoretic results
(see Appendix 1.2).
Figure 2 maps the agreements reached in the evolutionary system (for the same settings, i.e.,
p = 0:7 and n = 10) onto a two-dimensional plane. Each point in this plane shows the utility for
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Figure 2: Agreements reached by the evolving agents at the start of a typical EA run (generation 0) are shown
in Fig. 2a (for p = 0:7 and n = 10). Agreements reached after 100 generations are shown in Fig. 2b. Each
agreement is indicated by a point in these two-dimensional planes. The Pareto-ecient frontier is indicated
with a solid line. In point S [at (0:7; 0:7)] both agents obtain the maximum share for their most important
issue, and receive nothing for the other issue. Note that, after 100 generations, almost all agreements are
located in the vicinity of the Pareto-ecient frontier.
both agents which results from an agreement. Agreements can never be located above the so-called
\Pareto-ecient frontier" in this plane (indicated by the solid line). An agreement is located on the
Pareto-ecient frontier when an increase of utility for one agent necessarily results in a decrease of
utility for the other agent. A special point on the Pareto-ecient frontier is S. In this symmetric point
[at (0:7; 0:7)] both agents obtain the maximum share of the issue they value the most, and receive
nothing of the less important issue. Initially, at generation 0, many agreements are located far from
the Pareto-ecient frontier. After 100 generations, however, the agents have learned to coordinate
their behaviour and most agreements are Pareto-ecient. It is important to note that, even in the
long run, the agents keep exploring the search space. This results in continuing movements of the
\cloud" of agreements (visible in Fig. 2b) along the Pareto-ecient frontier. The (mean) long-term
behaviour of the evolving agents is studied in more detail in the next section.
Results in this section thus show that the adaptive agents learn to reach an agreement in an ecient
way, viz. on the Pareto-ecient frontier.
3.2 Comparison with Game-Theoretic Results
The computational results are compared in more detail with game-theoretic results in this section.
The key equilibrium concept used by game theorists to analyse extensive-form games
5
is the subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) [16, pp. 97-101]. Two strategies are in SPE if they constitute a Nash
equilibrium in any subgame which remains after an arbitrary sequence of oers and replies made
from the beginning of the game. Rubinstein successfully applied this notion of subgame-perfection to
5
That is, games with a tree structure.
7bargaining games [21]. His main theorem states that the innite-horizon alternating-oers game has
a unique SPE in which the agents agree immediately on a deal (if time is valuable). Our experimental
setup diers in two respects from Rubinstein's model (see Section 2.1). First, we use a nite-length
instead of an innite-length bargaining game. Second, the agents bargain over multiple issues instead
of a single issue. This changes the game-theoretic analysis in some respects, as we show in Appendix 1.
It is important to note that we assume in the game-theoretic analysis of Appendix 1 that the bar-
gaining agents behave fully rational and have complete information (for instance about the importance
of the dierent issues for their opponent). Both assumptions are obviously not valid for the adaptive
agents in our computational experiments. The adaptive agents are boundedly rational because they
only experience the prot of their interactions with other agents. The SPE behaviour of fully ratio-
nal agents will nevertheless serve as a useful theoretical benchmark to interpret the behaviour of the
boundedly-rational agents in our experiments.
As we mentioned before in Section 3.1, at subgame-perfect equilibrium the last agent in turn receives
the entire bargaining surplus (for each issue) if p = 1 (see Appendix 1.1). Hence, we expect the tness
of agents in population 1 to converge to unity if n is odd, and to converge to zero if n is even (the
opposite holds for the agents in population 2). This tendency is indeed clearly visible in Fig. 3a, even
for games as long as 10 rounds. Figure 3b shows that game theory predicts that the inuence of the
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Figure 3: Comparison of the evolutionary results with SPE results for (a) p = 1 (time indierence) and (b)
p = 0:95. The SPE predictions for successive values of n are connected to guide the eye. Figure 3a shows that
the nite length of the game has a strong impact on the long-term behaviour if p = 1. If p = 0:95, see Fig. 3b,
the nite character of the game is not fully exploited by the boundedly-rational agents in our computational
experiments. We measured the mean tness of agents in populations 1 and 2 after the initial transients died
out. The error bars indicate the standard deviations across 25 runs.
8nite length of the game diminishes for longer games if p = 0:95. Notice for instance in Fig. 3b that
the SPE partitioning is quite asymmetric (i.e., agents 1 and 2 obtain dierent payos) for small n,
but more symmetric when n is large. This eect is actually much stronger in the evolutionary system
(see Fig. 3b). The evolving agents do not reason backwards from the deadline (as is done in game
theory, see Appendix 1.2), but focus on the rst few rounds, where expected utility is relatively high.
This means that only few agreements are reached in later rounds. As a result, the deadline is not
perceived accurately by the evolving agents; in fact, the game length is strongly overestimated (also
cf. [22]).
Similar results are obtained for other values of p. However, as p becomes smaller, the inuence of
the game length on the SPE outcome also becomes smaller (also see [22]). Therefore, if p is small
(e.g., p < 0:8), the computational results automatically show a much better match with SPE outcomes
than if p is large. To be precise, the achieved agreements match the SPE perfectly, while still a small
number of disagreements occur.
It is interesting to note that, in the limit of n ! 1, game theory predicts that the agents in
population 1 have a tness of  0:71, whereas the agents in population 2 have a tness of  0:68. This
corresponds to a point in the vicinity of the symmetric point S, indicated in Fig. 2. The computational
experiments reported in Fig. 3b show that the behaviour of the agents corresponds much better to
an innite-horizon model than the nite-horizon model for n  8. The same behaviour was observed
for other EA settings (e.g. larger population size) and other negotiation situations (e.g. other weight
settings).
3.3 Further Experiments and Conclusions
In this section we study the performance of the EA for more complex bargaining problems (with
a larger number of issues). As a test case, we increased m to 8 (with randomly generated weight
vectors ~w
i
for each population of agents i = 1; 2). When all other parameters are kept the same as in
Table 1, we observe that for p = 1 the long-term outcomes of the EA do not converge to the extreme
partitionings shown in Fig. 3a (even for n as small as 5). In particular, the EA appears to be unstable.
When we increase the population size from 25 to 100 agents,
6
the extreme partitionings in Fig. 3a
reappear. Thus, for more complicated bargaining problems, the EA parameters must be adjusted.
E.g., when m is larger, suciently large population sizes must be used to increase stability.
Other experiments are performed with m = 8 and p < 1, using the adjusted population size as
described above. Similar observations are found as reported in Section 3.2 (like Fig. 3) for these
experiments.
To conclude, we compared the computational results with results from game theory. Game-theoretic
(SPE) results appear to be a very useful benchmark to investigate the results of the evolutionary
simulations. We investigated in detail the inuence of the nite length of the game. In computational
simulations without a risk of breakdown, agreements are predominantly reached in the nal round.
This deadline eect is consistent with human-like behaviour. Furthermore, the last agent in turn
successfully exploits his advantage and claims a take-it-or-leave-it deal (as occurs in SPE). In case
of a small risk of breakdown (p > 0:8), on the other hand, this last-mover advantage is smaller
than predicted by game theory. In fact, if the nite game becomes long enough, the deadline is no
longer perceived by the evolving agents. In that case, the evolutionary system actually computes
innite-horizon results (n =1). This deviation from SPE becomes negligible, however, if the risk of
breakdown is large (p < 0:8). Furthermore, it is important to work with suciently large population
sizes in the case of large(r) number of issues, to increase stability and the quality of the actual
outcomes.
6
To avoid a quadratic increase in the number of tness evaluations, each agent negotiates with 25 opponents from
the other population in this case. These opponents are selected at random (without replacement).
94. Social Extensions: Fairness
We extend the agent model within our evolutionary system in this section to study the inuence of
\fairness", an important aspect of real-life bargaining situations. The motivation and description of
this fairness model is given in Section 4.1. In the fairness model studied in Section 4.2 the evolving
agents only take the fairness of a proposed deal into account when the deadline is reached. Section 4.3
presents results obtained when agents perform a \fairness check" in each round. Section 4.4 further
analyses the model in Section 4.3. A comparison is made with game-theoretic (SPE) calculations for
a simple case.
4.1 Motivation and description: the fairness model
Game-theoretic models for rational agents often yield very asymmetric outcomes for the two parties.
We showed in Section 3.2 (see Fig. 3a) that such \unfair" behaviour can also emerge in a system
of evolving agents. Game-theoretic (SPE) results have also been compared to human behaviour in
laboratory experiments in the past (see [19] for an extensive overview). Large discrepancies between
human behaviour and SPE outcomes were found in these experimental studies, both for ultimatum
and multi-stage games [4, 11, 23]. These studies show for instance that a human proposer typically
demands less in the ultimatum game than predicted by SPE (in SPE a proposer demands the whole
surplus). A human responder also often rejects an unequal division of the surplus (even if the game is
played only once against a particular opponent), whereas in SPE the responder accepts all proposals.
A possible explanation for the occurrence of these discrepancies between theory and practice is
the strong inuence of social or cultural norms on the individual decision-making process. Binmore
et al. [4] argue, for example, that the proposer in the ultimatum game does not demand the whole
surplus (as subgame perfection predicts), because he values the \fairness" of the partitioning. Another
hypothesis is that the responders tends to reject unfair or \insultingly low" proposals [19, p. 264].
Therefore, an anticipating proposer should lower his demand in order to avoid a disagreement, this
way taking into account the expectations about his opponent's behaviour. The importance of this
phenomenon is also studied in [8].
Lin and Sunder [11] recently proposed a model in line with the second hypothesis stated above.
In their model, the probability of acceptance of a proposal increases with the amount oered to the
responder. Such a model, making more realistic assumptions about the agents' behaviour, appears to
organise the data from experiments with humans better than the SPE model [11]. We will introduce
a fairness model in our evolutionary system that has correspondence with Lin and Sunder's model.
The model described in [11] is used to evaluate ultimatum game experiments only (i.e., n = 1). We
extend this approach to multiple-stage games in two dierent ways. On the one hand, we investigate
the system's behaviour if the responding agent has a single fairness check in the last round. On
the other hand, we investigate the system's behaviour if the responding agent has a fairness check
independent of the round number. The rst case is motivated by the deadline-eect observed in the
experiments without a risk of breakdown (see Section 3.2): most agreements are reached in the last
round and the nal proposer then receives almost the whole bargaining surplus. The second case,
however, is more likely to be an appropriate model for human behaviour.
We now introduce fairness by extending the agent model (see Section 2.1) as follows. If the value
of an oer exceeds the responder's threshold, he has the opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. The
probability that he nally accepts the agreement is a function of the acquired utility. This function
is the so-called fairness function. This function is piece-wise linear, with up to three segments.
7
The
instances that we use are shown in Fig. 4.
8
We now further distinguish between two dierent extended
agent models. In the rst model, the fairness function is eective at the deadline only (this is studied
in Section 4.2). In the second model, the fairness function is eective at any moment (this is studied
in Section 4.3).
7
Piece-wise linear functions nicely t the experimental data reported in [11].
8
We want to remark here that, although the fairness function is the same for all agents, the actual fairness function
can depend on cultural norms in the real world [11].
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Figure 4: Dierent fairness functions used by the agents in the evolutionary experiments to determine the
degree of fairness of agreements. Each function species the probability that the responding agent accepts a
potential agreement as a function of the acquired utility. The functions range from a case without a fairness
check (function no. 0) to a case (no. 5) in which even fair agreements are rejected with a high probability.
Note that the fairness model is an extension on the responder's behaviour, and does not replace the
responder's thresholds. In Appendix 1.3 we show that, for a simple bargaining game, the thresholds
are indeed not superuous and still play an important role in the outcome of the SPE when fairness
is applied.
4.2 Fairness check at the deadline
In this section, fairness is applied by the responding agents on potential agreements in the last round.
We use p = 1 and n = 3 in these experiments (other settings are as before, see Table 1). Therefore,
the fairness function is only used by the agents in population 2 in the third round. Figure 5 shows that
if the agents in population 2 use fairness function 1 (i.e., a weak fairness model), the partitioning is
much less extreme than in case of no fairness check (function 0). However, the agents in population 1
still reach a relatively high tness (utility) level. Fair agreements evolve, on the other hand, when
the agents in population 2 use function 2 (a case with average fairness). In this case the mean
long-term tness is approximately equal to 0:7 for all agents (most agreements are located close to
the symmetric point S in Fig. 2). However, when a stronger fairness function is used by the agents
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Figure 5: Inuence of dierent fairness functions on the mean tness of the evolving agents (for p = 1 and
n = 3). Agreements are only re-evaluated if the deadline of the game is actually reached. Equal payos for
both agents is achieved when fairness function 2 is used. In case of a \regular" fairness function, such as
functions 3 to 5, the roles are switched and agent 2 receives a larger share. The dierent fairness functions
are specied in Fig. 4.
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From our experiments it thus follows that fair agreements can evolve if fairness is evaluated each
round, even when the acceptance probability becomes relatively low: the fairness of the deals is much
more stable w.r.t. the actual choice of the fairness function when applied each round. Of course, the
number of actual agreements drops if a strong fairness function is used, resulting in a (mutual) lower
tness.
We also performed several additional experiments, for instance with dierent weight vectors and
with m > 2. A general nding is that extreme outcomes of the evolutionary process do not occur if
the agents apply a fairness check. This does not mean, however, that in the long term the agents in
population 1 and population 2 always reach the exact same tness level (as is suggested in Fig. 6,
especially for fairness functions 2, 3 and 4). In particular, unequal outcomes can occur if the Pareto-
ecient frontier is asymmetric.
10
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Figure 7: Agreements reached at generation 300 by the evolving agents when agent 1 has weight
settings (0:5; 0:5), and agent 2 uses (0:2; 0:8). The responding agents evaluate fairness using function
no. 4. Notice that with these weight settings the Pareto-ecient frontier is asymmetric. The point
NBS is called the Nash bargaining solution, and maximises the product of the agents' utilities (see [3,
Ch. 5] for further details). The point S denotes the symmetric point on the Pareto-ecient frontier,
where the agents obtain equal payos.
An asymmetric Pareto-ecient frontier of a 2-issue negotiation problem is shown in Fig. 7. In this
case, agent 1 values both issues equally important, whereas agent 2 has dierent valuations for each
issue (his weights are 0:2 and 0:8 for issues 1 and 2 respectively). This creates an advantage for
agent 2. If each agent obtains the whole surplus on his most important issue, agent 1 obtains 0:5,
whereas agent 2 gets 0:8.
11
The symmetric point, on the other hand, is located at (
8
13
;
8
13
).
12
Both solutions can be considered to be fair outcomes in dierent ways: the rst solution maximises
the product of the agents' utilities and also splits the surplus equally, whereas in the second case
equal utility levels are obtained for both agents (see [17, Ch. 16] for a related discussion). In the
computational results, we observe that, when fairness functions 2-5 are applied, the agreements are
divided and are usually concentrated in two separate clusters (clouds). An exemplar snapshot is shown
in Fig. 7, where the agents apply fairness function no. 4. It follows that, on average, the agents in
population 2 obtain a signicantly larger payo in these experiments. The issue of the choice of and
distribution over multiple \fair" agreement points seems an important issue for further research, in
both a computational setting as well as in experimental economics.
10
A symmetric Pareto-frontier is mirror-symmetric with respect to the diagonal in the two-dimensional utility plane
(e.g. Fig. 2).
11
This outcome corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution [3, Ch. 5], see Fig. 7.
12
This outcome corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution [10].
13
Payo agent 1 Payo agent 2
SPE 0:419 0:391
EA 0:391 (0:022) 0:412 (0:014)
Table 2: Comparison of the adaptive agents' payos in the EA with SPE results. Results for the
adaptive agents are obtained after 300 generations (averaged over 25 runs).
To conclude, in this section we showed that the outcome of the agreements are quite robust and
independent of the fairness function when the agents apply fairness each round. In case of two-issue
negotiations with a symmetric Pareto-ecient frontier, most agreements are reached at the symmetric
point. In the asymmetric case, fair solutions can also be obtained. The solutions are then distributed
over various possible outcomes, which can all be considered fair in dierent ways.
In the next section, we investigate the evolving strategies of the agents in more detail. The com-
putational results for models with fairness are also complemented by a game-theoretic analysis for
single-issue negotiations in this section.
4.4 Comparison with Game-Theoretic Results
Although incorporating fairness aspects makes the analysis more complicated, SPE strategies can
again be derived for nite-length games using a backward induction mechanism. The equations for
calculating the SPE strategies and outcomes are given in Appendix 1.3. A solution for m = 1, n = 3
and p = 1 is also given in Appendix 1.3. In this example, oers are evaluated with fairness function
no. 4 in Fig. 4. This function, as well as m = 1, were chosen because of mathematical feasibility.
We note that solving these above equations for multiple issues becomes increasingly complex, and is
beyond the scope of this paper; this is left for further research. We henceforth focus on the manageable
single-issue negotiations.
Section 4.4 compares the game-theoretic and EA results for single-issue negotiations and analyses
the strategies in detail. Only small deviations between theoretical and computational results are
found. Section 4.4 shows that even better results can be achieved by altering the mutation scheme.
Strategy analysis Table 2 shows both the SPE results and the payos obtained by the evolving
agents (in the long run) in the game with m = 1, n = 3, and p = 1, and with (the rather strong)
fairness function 4. Notice that the SPE payos are in good agreement with the outcome of the
evolutionary experiments. However, in SPE agent 1's payo is slightly larger than agent 2's payo.
Exactly the opposite eect is visible in the EA, although Table 2 shows that dierences between theory
and experiment are small (we will further address this in Section 4.4). Henceforth, we will analyse
the evolving strategies in more detail. This analysis shows in what sense the negotiation strategies of
the evolving agents are aected by fairness considerations.
Round Oer Oer Threshold Threshold
(SPE) (EA) (SPE) (EA)
1 0:609 0:58 0:06 0:391 0:23 0:21
2 0:375 0:39 0:07 0:250 0:14 0:13
3 0:500 0:48 0:09 0:000 0:13 0:13
Table 3: Comparison of the evolved strategies with game-theoretic (SPE) results. The oer of the
proposing agent is shown for each round, together with the acceptance threshold of the responder in
the same round. Results for the adaptive agents are obtained after 300 generations (averaged over 25
runs).
Table 3 compares the oers of the evolving agents (for each round) with SPE results. Recall that
oers are labelled in terms of the amount received by player 1 (see Section 2.1). Table 3 shows that
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the oers made by the evolving agents agree well with SPE results for all rounds. Moreover, because
of the fairness function, agreements are reached in all rounds (both in SPE and in the EA agreements
per round are in the range of 20 40%), with some emphasis on the rst round. This can be calculated
from Table 3 for SPE, while similar acceptance rates for each round were observed in the EA.
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Table 3 also shows the acceptance thresholds for each round as predicted by game theory and as
generated by the EA. In SPE, the threshold of the (responding) agent is equal to the payo of this
agent when he rejects the proposer's oer and waits until the next round (see Appendix 1.3). Table 3
shows that in rounds 2 and 3 the thresholds in SPE are not really relevant. This explains the large
variance in the thresholds of the evolutionary agents in rounds 2 and 3 (see Table 3), viz.: in the
evolutionary experiments the value of the threshold does not aect the results (in rounds 2 and 3) as
long as the threshold value is below the payo received by the responder. In round 1, however, the
threshold is important in SPE and inuences the oer made. The computational experiments seem
to indicate otherwise, and show a lower average threshold value compared to SPE results. Notice,
however, that the variance is rather high for this variable. The latter (0:23 0:21) forces the oers to
a similar level as in SPE. We further discuss the inuence of the threshold below.
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Figure 8: Evolving threshold values for the rst round in the population of initial responders (popu-
lation 2) for a single run of the EA. The dispersion from the mean value is indicated with error-bars.
Notice the signicant variance, both within the population and during the course of evolution.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the threshold value for the rst round in the population of initial
responders for a single experiment. The error-bars in this gure indicate the dispersion from the mean
value of the threshold. Notice the signicant variance, both within the population and during the
course of evolution. One the one hand, this is the reason that although the mean threshold is lower
than in SPE, the eect on the oers of the evolving agents in population 1 is similar. On the other
hand, the slight deviations (from SPE) of the oers made by the adaptive agents can be explained by
these variations in the threshold values: because of the occurrence of frequent (stochastic) positive
peaks in this threshold value, agent 1 has a slightly lower oer than that from SPE to avoid a too
large number of rejected proposals.
We also checked the \consistency" of the strategies of the evolutionary agents in longer games. In
SPE, the oers and thresholds in the nal rounds are identical regardless of the game length. We
performed an experiment with n = 6. The strategies followed by the evolutionary agents in the last 3
rounds of both games (i.e., n = 3 and n = 6) indeed turned out to be similar, with similar thresholds
13
Acceptance rates are approximately 39%, 22%, 20% for the SPE rounds 1-3, and 36 4%, 25 3%, 20 2% for the
EA rounds 1-3.
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and oers.
To conclude, this relatively simple bargaining situation shows a good match between theoretical
(SPE) and experimental results. Furthermore, when fairness norms are applied, the outcome of the
negotiation process comes to depend on the actual round in which an agreement is nally reached.
We will consider improvements in the EA performance in Section 4.4.
Tuning the EA Parameters We now investigate the further optimization of EA parameters. We
especially focus on increasing stability in the populations and improving the match between EA and
SPE as discussed in Section 4.4.
Instead of self-adaptive mutation step-sizes 
i
(see Section 2.2), we use an annealing mechanism for
the mutation step sizes in our EA.
14
Here, the mutation step-size gradually decreases as follows. At the
beginning of each EA run, the mutation step-sizes are set equal to 
i
(0) = 0:1 (as before, see Table 1).
The step sizes then exponentially decrease until 
i
= 0:01 after 1000 generations. This procedure
indeed reduces the uctuations in the threshold values and the oers in the long run. Results for
experiments with this EA setting appear to be in excellent agreement with SPE results, see Table 4.
Payo agent 1 Payo agent 2
SPE 0:419 0:391
EA with decreasing 
i
0:416 0:012 0:395 0:009
Table 4: Comparison of the evolutionary agents' payos with SPE results when the mutation step-
sizes 
i
of the adaptive agents exponentially decrease in the course of evolution. Results for the
evolutionary agents are obtained after 1000 generations. Notice the excellent agreement between
theory and experiment.
We also applied this method on the symmetric two-issue negotiation problem as described in Sec-
tion 4.3. In this case (m = 2), we found no signicant eect of the new mutation scheme on the average
tness of the populations. We suspect that this is due to the integrative nature of the negotiation
problem: the results obtained in case of two issues are benecial for both parties and are therefore
already much more stable.
In this section we have shown that by choosing other EA parameters, the EA can be ne-tuned to
a more stable situation if needed. This rendered an optimal match with the SPE results for m = 1.
5. Conclusions
We have investigated a system for negotiations, in which agents learn eective negotiation strategies
using evolutionary algorithms (EAs). Negotiations are governed by a nite-horizon version of the
alternating-oers game. Both negotiations with and without a risk of breakdown are studied. Fur-
thermore, several issues are negotiated simultaneously. In our experiments, the agents have dierent
preferences regarding the importance of the issues. This implies that the agents can reach mutually
benecial agreements if they coordinate their behaviour in an optimal manner.
To validate the evolutionary approach, we applied techniques from the eld of game theory. In this
validation part, the long-run behaviour of the evolving bargaining agents is compared with subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) predictions for fully rational and completely informed agents. These SPE
results appear to be very useful to interpret the behaviour of the (boundedly-rational) evolutionary
agents. When no risk of breakdown exists, the evolutionary agents delay almost all agreements until
the deadline is reached. The last agent in turn then proposes a take-it-or-leave-it oer and demands
most of the surplus for each issue. This extreme division of the surplus is also predicted by game-
theoretic SPE, whereas the deadline timing is not (SPE outcomes are indierent on timing here).
Notice that this timing in the evolving agents actually corresponds very well to real-life situations.
14
A similar approach was applied in [1] for a genetic algorithm.
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When a risk of breakdown exists, on the other hand, most agreements are reached in the very rst
round. If the the nite game becomes long enough, the deadline is therefore no longer perceived by
the evolving agents. In that case, the evolutionary system deviates from SPE outcomes and actually
computes innite-horizon results. However, if the risk of breakdown becomes very small, the inuence
of the game length on SPE outcomes also becomes smaller. Henceforth, the deviation between EA
and game-theoretic results then becomes negligible. Note that the deviation from game theory may
correspond better to real-life situations.
In the second part of the paper, we reconsider bargaining with no risk of breakdown. An extreme
division of the bargaining surplus, predicted by theoretical (SPE) models in this case, appears to
be unrealistic in many real-life bargaining situations. We therefore introduced and modelled the
important concept of \fairness" in our evolutionary system. In this extended model, a responding
agent carries out a fairness check before an agreement is denitely accepted. This fairness check was
modelled in two ways. In the rst model, a responding agent only considers fairness at the deadline.
In the second model, fairness is considered for any potential agreement, independent of the round in
which it occurs.
In both cases, fair outcomes can be obtained. In the rst case, fairness results are very sensitive
to the actual fairness function (which can be cultural dependent [11]). In the second case, however,
the outcomes are rather insensitive to the actual choice of fairness function. Thus, much more robust
results are obtained; these become rather independent of reasonable variations in the actual fairness
function. This second case also seems to correspond more to real-world situations. The second fairness
model was also applied for an asymmetric bargaining situation (where the players have asymmetric
preferences). Multiple outcomes then exist which can be considered \fair" in dierent ways. Agree-
ments reached by the evolutionary agents are then usually divided in separate clusters around these
fair points.
We also performed a theoretical analysis of the fairness models. As an example, we compared
theoretical results for a simple bargaining game (concerning a single issue) with the outcome of
evolutionary experiments. A good match between theoretical and experimental results was observed.
Interestingly, both the theoretical and the experimental approach shows that several outcomes can co-
exist when such a fairness model is used: The deal then depends on the round in which the agreement
is reached. These results are encouraging and open new prospects to capture human behaviour (as
observed in laboratory experiments) in computational models with articial agents.
Furthermore, we improved the results for several cases by ne-tuning the EA parameters. In partic-
ular, we used other mutation schemes or population sizes to increase stability in the EA population.
These optimisations in the EA parameters resulted in better (optimal) matches with the corresponding
game-theoretical results.
Note that the results are obtained by the EA without any a priori knowledge of the opponent's
preferences. These preferences are implicitly learned within the negotiation strategy in the course of
evolution.
A simulation environment as described here facilitates the study of cases for which a rigorous math-
ematical approach is unwieldy or even intractable. An interesting line of research is to further explore
the notion of fairness and to compare the computational outcomes with results from experimental
studies with human subjects. Of particular interest is the study of asymmetric multi-issue bargaining
situations, where more than one outcome can be considered \fair". This raises several new research
questions for experimental economics as well as computational sciences.
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APPENDIX
1. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Multi-Issue Negotiations
Subgame perfect equilibrium strategies for multiple-stage games with complete information can be
derived using a backward induction approach. In this appendix we follow the same approach as in [22],
but extend the analysis to multi-issue negotiations and to models which take fairness considerations
into account. In Appendix 1.1, we study a model without a risk of breakdown. The more general
model (with a risk of breakdown) is then investigated in Appendix 1.2. This model is extended to the
case in which the agents perform an additional fairness check in Appendix 1.3.
1.1 Model without a Risk of Breakdown (p = 1)
Because time plays no role in this model, the last agent in turn has the opportunity to reject all
proposals from his opponent and demand the entire surplus (for each issue) in the last round. In
subgame perfect equilibrium, the other agent accepts this proposal (see also the discussion in [3, pp.
200-201]). If the maximum number of rounds n is odd, agent 1 will therefore receive the entire surplus,
whereas agent 2 receives all in case n is even. Due to the absence of time pressure multiple subgame
perfect equilibria exist in this case. Although these equilibria dier in the timing of the agreements,
the all result in the same outcome (i.e., the agent in turn at t = n 1 always receives the entire surplus
for all issues). It is for instance subgame perfect for the last responder to concede the entire surplus
(for all issues) to his opponent before the deadline is actually reached or, alternatively, to accept a
take-it-or-leave-it deal from the opponent at any point in time.
1.2 Model with a Risk of Breakdown (p < 1)
Assume that agent i makes a proposal ~o
i
(t) to his opponent, agent j, in round t of the negotiations
(t < n). Assume also that agent i knows that agent j's threshold is equal to 
j
(t). It is then a best
response for agent i to propose a Pareto-ecient deal to agent j. Consider for example the two-issue
bargaining problem depicted in Fig. 2. Suppose agent i proposes an equal partitioning for both issues
to agent j. In case of an agreement, this would yield the utility pair (0:5; 0:5) in Fig. 2. However,
agent j would be indierent if agent i demanded the whole surplus for his most important issue and
6=21 for the other issue. This way, agent i's utility would increase from 0:5 to 11=14, whereas agent
j's utility would remain the same. This latter agreement is located on the Pareto-ecient frontier. A
similar argument holds if the roles of the agents are reversed and agent j makes a proposal to agent i.
The SPE partitioning can now be calculated as follows. If the maximum number of rounds n is
even, agent 2 will be the proposer in the last round (i.e., at t = n   1). Agent 2 will then demand
the whole surplus for each issue and agent 1 will receive nothing. This division of the surplus would
yield agent 2 a payo (expected utility) of 
2
(t = n   1) = p
n 1
, where 
i
(t) denotes agent i's
payo in the bargaining game starting at time t. We now analyse the previous round (t = n   2).
Suppose agent 1's oer to agent 2 is ~o
1
(t = n   2). Agent 2's payo 
2
(t = n   2) would then be
p
n 2
u
2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]. In equilibrium, at t = n  2 agent 1 should propose agent 2 a payo-equivalent
deal [i.e., 
2
(t = n   2) = 
2
(t = n   1)], . This implies that u
2
[~o
1
(t = n   2)] should be equal
to p. Agent 1's payo 
1
(t = n   2) is then p
n 2
f
1
(p), where f
1
(u
2
) describes the location of the
Pareto-ecient frontier. This function returns the utility of agent 1 when agent 2's utility is equal to
u
2
and the agreement is Pareto-ecient.
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At t = n   3, agent 2 can, in a similar fashion, propose
an equivalent oer (in terms of payo) and receive a payo of 
2
(t = n  3) = p
n 3
f
2
[pf
1
(p)]. (The
f
2
(u
1
) function is the inverse of the f
1
function.)
This procedure is then repeated until the beginning of the game is reached (at t = 0). The same
line of reasoning holds if the number of rounds is odd (simply switch the roles of agent 1 and agent
2). As in the innite-horizon game [21], the agents agree immediately on a deal. Table 3.2 shows the
SPE partitionings for dierent game lengths.
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For the bargaining problem studied in this paper (depicted in Fig. 2), the Pareto-ecient frontier is described by
the function f
1
(u
2
) =
0:7
0:3
(1  u
2
) for u
2
> 0:7. For u
2
 0:7, f
1
(u
2
) = 1 
0:3
0:7
u
2
.
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n Payo agent 1 [
1
(t = 0)] (SPE) Payo agent 2 [
2
(t = 0)] (SPE)
1 1 0
2 f
1
(p) p
3 f
1
(pf
2
(p)) pf
2
(p)
4 f
1
(pf
2
(pf
1
(p))) pf
2
(pf
1
(p))
5 f
1
(pf
2
(pf
1
(pf
2
(p)))) pf
2
(pf
1
(pf
2
(p))))
6 f
1
(pf
2
(pf
1
(pf
2
(pf
1
(p))))) pf
2
(pf
1
(pf
2
(pf
1
(p)))))
: : : : : : : : :
Table 5: Payos for agent 1 and agent 2 for dierent lengths n of the alternating-oers game, assuming that
both agents use SPE strategies.
1.3 Model with fairness
The fairness models evaluated in Section 4.2 (i.e., with a fairness check at the deadline only) and in
Section 4.3 (i.e., with a fairness check in each round) are analysed in this appendix. As in Appendix 1.2,
we apply backward induction to deduce the SPE partitioning. The fairness function is now formally
denoted as g
t
(u). This (real-valued) function returns the probability of acceptance of a proposal in
round t in case the responding agent's utility is equal to u. If a fairness check is performed only in the
last round, g
t
(u) = 1 for all t < n  1. In case the same fairness check is performed each round, g
t
(u)
is independent of t. We assume that the fairness function is a monotonic non-decreasing function of
u and that g
t
(u = 1) = 1. Let agent i be the agent proposing a deal at time t and agent  i the
responder. We then abbreviate g
t
[u
 i
(~o
i
(t))] (the probability of acceptance of oer ~o in round t) as
p
acc
t
(~o).
If n is even, agent 2 will be the proposer in the last round (at t = n   1). Agent 2 will then
propose an oer ~o
2
(t = n   1) which maximises his payo (in SPE). Agent 2 receives a payo of
p
n 1
u
2
[~o
2
(t = n 1)] if his oer is accepted. The acceptance probability is equal to p
acc
n 1
[~o
2
(t = n 1)].
Agent 2's payo in round t = n  1 is therefore:

2
(t = n  1) = max
~o
2
(t=n 1)2P
p
n 1
u
2
[~o
2
(t = n  1)]p
acc
n 1
[~o
2
(t = n  1)]; (1.1)
where P  [0; 1]
m
is the set containing all Pareto-ecient oers. Analogously, the payo for agent 1
in round t = n  1 is equal to:

1
(t = n  1) = p
n 1
u
1
[~o
2
(t = n  1)]p
acc
n 1
[~o
2
(t = n  1)]: (1.2)
It is again straightforward to show that it is optimal to propose a Pareto-ecient deal. Assume
for instance, that a Pareto-inecient oer is made. The proposer of this oer can then improve his
payo by selecting an oer on the Pareto-frontier which yields his opponent the same payo. Because
the probability of acceptance only depends on the responder's utility of this oer, this will not aect
the fairness evaluation.
We now analyse the previous round (t = n   2). In SPE, at t = n   2 agent 2 only accepts a
deal which is at least equal to the payo 
2
(t = n   1) that he receives in the next round (in SPE).
Therefore, 
2
(t = n  2)  
2
(t = n   1) in SPE. Eectively, 
2
(t = n   1) acts as a threshold used
by agent 2 to determine the minimal acceptable oer at t = n   2. Some elementary manipulations
then show that in SPE agent 1 should make an oer ~o
1
(t = n  2) such that
p
n 2
u
2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]  
2
(t = n  1); (1.3)
otherwise, agent 2 rejects the proposal at t = n  2 to earn 
2
(t = n  1) in the last round. We now
dene R  [0; 1]
m
to be the set of oers for which Eq. 1.3 is not violated. In SPE, agent 1's payo in
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round t = n  2 then equals

1
(t = n  2) = max
~o
1
(t=n 2)2P\R
p
n 2
u
1
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]p
acc
n 2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]
+f1  p
acc
n 2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]g
1
(t = n  1): (1.4)
In a similar fashion, we can calculate agent 2's payo at t = n  2 in SPE:

2
(t = n  2) = p
n 2
u
2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]p
acc
n 2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]
+f1  p
acc
n 2
[~o
1
(t = n  2)]g
2
(t = n  1): (1.5)
For t = n   3 expressions very similar to Eqs. 1.4 and 1.5 can be derived (but the roles of the two
agents switch). This procedure is then repeated until the beginning of the game is reached (at t = 0).
The same line of reasoning holds if the number of rounds is odd (simply switch the roles of agent 1
and agent 2).
In the previous model without fairness (see Appendix 1.2) all agreements occur in the rst round
in SPE (for p < 1). When the agents apply a fairness check in each round, however, even in SPE a
signicant number of agreements occurs after the rst round. In this case, the strategy followed in all
rounds comes to play a role in determining the outcome of the game.
We also remark that, although a responder's fairness considerations determines for a large part the
oers made by a proposer, this does not make the responder's thresholds superuous in SPE. Recall
that the role of the threshold is reected in Eq. 1.3. This will also become apparent in the example
shown below.
Simple example (see Section 4.4) We will now apply the general approach presented above to a
simple single-issue (i.e., m = 1) bargaining problem. Because m = 1, the oer vector ~o(t) has only a
single component. We denote the value of this component as x(t) in the remainder of this appendix.
It is obvious (because the agents are assumed to be risk neutral, see Section 2.1) that u
1
[x(t)] = x(t),
and u
2
[x(t)] = 1 x(t) for 0  t  n 1. The agents evaluate the fairness of the oers (in each round)
using fairness function 4 in Fig. 4 [i.e., g
t
(u) = u]. Furthermore, we take n = 3 and p = 1. Notice
that, because the number of rounds n is odd in this example, we need to switch the roles of agent 1
and agent 2 when we apply Eqs. 1.1-1.5 in the following.
Agent 1 makes an oer to agent 2 in the nal round (at t = 2). In SPE, agent 1 applies Eq. 1.1 to
maximise his payo 
1
(t = 2). Substituting parameters for this problem, the product term on the RHS
of Eq. 1.1 becomes u
1
[x(t = 2)]g
2
[u
2
(x(t = 2)], which can be simplied further to x(t = 2)[1 x(t = 2)].
This term is maximised for x(t = 2) = 0:5, which results in 
1
(t = 2) = 0:25. Using Eq. 1.2, the
payo of agent 2, 
2
(t = 2), is then also equal to [1  x(t = 2)]x(t = 2) = 0:25.
Agent 2 makes a move at t = 1. We initially assume that the condition stated in Eq. 1.3 is not
violated by agent 2's oer. Agent 2's payo is then determined by applying Eq. 1.4. Substituting the
parameters of this problem and simplifying, the term that should be maximised in Eq. 1.4 becomes
equal to [1  x(t)]x(t) + [1   x(t)]0:25. This term is maximised for x(t = 1) = 0:375. The condition
stated in Eq. 1.3 is not violated because u
1
(0:375) = 0:375  0:25. Our initial assumption therefore
turns out to be valid. We can now apply Eqs. 1.4 and 1.5 to derive that 
1
(t = 1)  0:297 and

2
(t = 1)  0:391.
Agent 1 proposes an oer in the rst round (at t = 0). Again, we initially ignore Eq. 1.3. Using
Eq. 1.4, agent 1 then maximises his payo 
1
(t = 0). This results in x(t = 0)  0:648. However, this
oer violates the condition in Eq. 1.3, since u
2
(0:648) = 0:352 < 
2
(t = 1). Agent 1 should therefore
propose a payo-equivalent deal to agent 2 [i.e., 
2
(t = 0) = 
2
(t = 1)]. For x  0:609 this condition is
satised and agent 2 becomes indierent between accepting or refusing this deal. Subgame perfection
then predicts that agent 2 accepts this proposal, yielding agent 1 a payo of  0:419. Tables 2 and
3 summarise these theoretical predictions. Notice that, in this example, Eq. 1.3 (i.e., the responder's
threshold) indeed plays a role in round 1, whereas in the rounds 2 and 3 the equation does not inuence
the proposals made in SPE.
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